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TEACHING AND LEARNING PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER 
THE STEALTH REVOLUTION 
Deborah J. Challener* 
In The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction,1 Professor 
Michael Hoffheimer uses Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
(BMS),2 the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest personal jurisdiction decision, 
as a vehicle to critically examine the Court’s recent narrowing of both 
general and specific personal jurisdiction. Since 2011, the Court has 
decided six cases in which it has found that a lower court’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction violated the Constitution.3 As Professor Hoffheimer 
notes, commentators agree that these cases have dramatically changed the 
law of personal jurisdiction4 and have made it more difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, for plaintiffs to identify a forum.5  
Nevertheless, as Professor Hoffheimer explains, “members of the 
Court repeatedly deny that they are altering existing law. On the contrary, 
they insist that the Court’s holdings are controlled by long-settled legal 
principles.”6 Professor Hoffheimer’s thesis is “that the Court is engaged 
in a stealth revolution, a process of radically changing existing law while 
claiming to follow controlling precedent.”7 After thoroughly discussing 
the lower court and Supreme Court opinions in BMS,8 Professor 
Hoffheimer elaborates upon the many costs associated with the stealth 
revolution.9 For example, the Court’s failure to fully explain its personal 
jurisdiction decisions has created much new uncertainty in the law of 
personal jurisdiction.10 Moreover, because the Court repeatedly insists 
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 1. Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. 
REV. 499 (2018). 
 2. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 3. See id. at 1784; BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011). 
 4. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 503–04, 541 & n.234. 
 5. Id. at 501–02. 
 6. Id. at 504. 
 7. Id. at 499. 
 8. See id. at 505–24. 
 9. See id. at 546–51. 
 10. Id. at 546–47. Specifically, Professor Hoffheimer contends that this failure creates 
uncertainties about:  
 
(1) the reasons why general jurisdiction must constrict over time; (2) the reasons 
why general and specific jurisdiction must be conceptually exclusive and why 
there can be no hybridization; (3) the reasons supporting a tight relatedness 
requirement for specific jurisdiction; (4) the status of the two-part 
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that it is simply applying settled precedent, its opinions not only fail to 
“provide []sufficient guidance to lower courts about how to apply the 
holdings to future cases with different facts,”11 but also suggest that lower 
courts either do not understand the law of personal jurisdiction or have 
gone rogue in refusing to apply clear precedent.12 This, in turn, 
contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judiciary.13 
Professor Hoffheimer concludes his article “with a call for greater 
transparency, in effect, to restore confidence in the Court’s current 
jurisprudence.”14  
Professors Patrick Borchers and Michael Vitiello have both written 
excellent Responses to The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction.15 
For example, Professor Borchers contends that the reason the Court has 
not fully explained the constitutional rationale for “its radical contraction 
of personal jurisdiction” is that “the Court doesn’t have a clear rationale 
for why it closely regulates state court jurisdiction (and by extension 
federal court personal jurisdiction).”16 He concisely examines cases from 
Pennoyer v. Neff17 through BMS to illustrate the “wild vacillations” in the 
Court’s constitutional justification for its personal jurisdiction 
decisions.18 And he persuasively argues that these vacillations “in 
rationale bespeak a lack of clarity as to the constitutional 
underpinnings.”19 Professor Vitiello raises some additional issues that he 
hopes Professor Hoffheimer will address in the future, such as Justice 
Alito’s reliance on sovereignty to find jurisdiction lacking in BMS and 
the policy reasons for the more liberal justices’ willingness (aside from 
Justice Sotomayor) to join Justice Alito’s majority opinion in BMS.20 
I add my voice to Professors Borchers and Vitiello in this Response 
simply to point out one additional cost of the stealth revolution: the 
substantially increased difficulty of teaching and learning the law of 
personal jurisdiction which, in turn, erodes law students’ confidence in 
the Supreme Court as an institution. Of course, for various reasons, 
                                                                                                                     
methodological framework for specific jurisdiction; and (5) the reasons for 
avoiding constructions of specific jurisdiction that could replace older forms of 
general jurisdiction.  
Id. 
 11. Id. at 547. 
 12. See id. at 542–46, 549. 
 13. Id. at 499. 
 14. Michael Vitiello, Reflections on Hoffheimer’s The Stealth Revolution in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. F. 31, 35 (2018); see Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 552 
 15. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Muddy-Booted, Disingenuous Revolution in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. F. 21 (2018); Vitiello, supra note 14. 
 16. Borchers, supra note 15, at 22. 
 17.   95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 18. Id. at 22–26.  
 19. Id. at 25. 
 20. See Vitiello, supra note 14, at 35–40. 
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teaching and learning the law of personal jurisdiction has always been 
challenging. To grasp personal jurisdiction, students must “master[] . . . 
an evolving test in a series of Supreme Court cases where no one case is 
explicitly overruled.”21 The complexity of this task is compounded by a 
multitude of factors, including: the fact that students lack any prior 
context for understanding personal jurisdiction; many students read the 
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases without having first taken 
constitutional law; and the time devoted to teaching civil procedure, and 
therefore personal jurisdiction, has shrunk at many law schools.22 Today, 
as the Court drastically alters existing personal jurisdiction law while 
claiming to do no such thing, the difficulty level associated with teaching 
and learning personal jurisdiction has ratcheted up. As Professor 
Borchers notes, it is virtually impossible to believe that a topic which 
almost all first-year law students study, and which truly matters to 
practicing lawyers, “has become more irrational and confused” since 
2011 when the Supreme Court began deciding personal jurisdiction cases 
again—after two decades of silence.23 
If, as Professors Hoffheimer and Borchers write, the lower courts are 
confused by the Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions and the Court 
itself is confused about the constitutional rationale for those decisions,24 
imagine what first-year law students must think as they read and attempt 
to synthesize these cases. Consider, for example, the impression a case 
like J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,25 one of the Court’s recent 
personal jurisdiction decisions, makes on students. Professor Borchers 
succinctly summarizes J. McIntyre this way:  
 
[T]he Court could not produce a majority opinion. The four-
Justice plurality invoked a sovereignty rationale to deny a 
forum to a plaintiff injured in his home state by an industrial 
machine purchased there by his employer in the ordinary 
course of business. The three dissenting Justices emphasized 
the unfairness to the plaintiff and the lack of unfairness to 
the defendant in litigating in the forum. Two Justices 
concurred in the plurality’s denial of jurisdiction, saying 
little more than they were constrained by earlier 
precedents.26  
 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Cynthia Ho et al., An Active-Learning Approach to Teaching Tough Topics: Personal 
Jurisdiction as an Example, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 772, 773 (2016). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Borchers, supra note 15, at 21 (emphasis added). 
 24.  See id; Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 504–05. 
 25.  564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 26. Borchers, supra note 15, at 25. 
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Professor Borchers concludes: “Small wonder why lower courts are left 
rubbing their eyes before attempting to traverse a moonscape.”27 Small 
wonder that law students are left rubbing their eyes too. 
Given the confused nature of the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
decisions, how much, really, do first-year law students learn about the 
law of personal jurisdiction? They can probably parrot phrases like 
“minimum contacts,” “purposeful availment,” “stream of commerce,” 
and maybe even “fair play and substantial justice,” but what do they 
actually learn about this topic “of great practical import”? 28 In terms of 
the law itself, probably not much. But in terms of the Supreme Court as 
an institution, probably quite a bit. The disarray in personal jurisdiction 
law itself speaks volumes to students. Although they may miss much of 
the nuance in personal jurisdiction, they get the big picture. They 
understand that the Court has greatly reduced the fora available to 
plaintiffs, and they see that the Court has failed to explain why it is doing 
so. Moreover, students recognize that the Court’s recent decisions benefit 
defendants and harm plaintiffs. And regardless of whether they think a 
conservative Supreme Court with a pro-defendant bias is a good thing or 
a bad thing, they realize that the Court does not clarify why a plaintiff 
can’t sue in a forum that is obviously convenient for that plaintiff and just 
as obviously does not burden the defendant.  
When students read the plurality and concurring opinions in J. 
McIntyre, they quickly comprehend “[o]ne of the most stunning things” 
about these opinions: their utter lack of concern with fairness to the 
plaintiff, who was injured at work while using a metal-shearing machine 
purchased by his employer but could not sue the manufacturer of the 
machine—a British corporation—in his home state.29 But Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion, in particular, expresses great concern about 
the unfairness of hailing the British manufacturer into a court in the 
plaintiff’s home state30 “[e]ven though the corporation was clearly 
exploiting the U.S. market.”31  
So even if first-year law students don’t leave civil procedure with a 
strong understanding of the law of personal jurisdiction, they do leave 
civil procedure with a much less glowing view of the Court than they 
typically began law school with. They sense that the Court, at least in its 
personal jurisdiction decisions, is being unfair and not quite honest. As is 
often true, it can be very disenchanting to meet your heroes. By the time 
civil procedure is over, many law students have a dim and suspicious 
view of individual justices and the Court as an institution.  
                                                                                                                     
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 21. 
 29.   See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
 30.   See id. at 886. 
 31. Borchers, supra note 15,at 28. 
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Undoubtedly the Court hasn’t given much thought to the impact its 
personal jurisdiction decisions have on first-year law students. After all, 
the Court doesn’t seem to have given much thought to the “quandary” its 
decisions have created for lower courts judges and practitioners “over 
what ought to be an elementary threshold issue in which the rules are 
relatively clear.”32 But perhaps the Court should stop and think. To state 
the obvious, law students are the lawyers, judges, law professors, 
legislators, and, sometimes, presidents of tomorrow. As noted above, 
Professor Hoffheimer argues that one cost of the stealth revolution is the 
“narrative” it fosters “of lower court lawlessness that both devalues the 
work of the lower courts and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.”33 
To the extent that the stealth revolution erodes law students’ confidence 
in the Court, this erosion may have a ripple effect throughout the legal 
profession.  
In an era when the federal courts are under attack by the Executive 
branch34 and Chief Justice Roberts’ finds it necessary to publicly 
“defend[] the independence and integrity of the federal judiciary,”35 the 
Court can ill afford to continue to contribute to its own de-legitimization. 
Interestingly, when Chief Justice Roberts spoke out to defend the federal 
judiciary, he said: “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush 
judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an extraordinary group of 
dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing 
before them. That independent judiciary is something we should all be 
thankful for.”36 But this is not what law students learn when they study 
the Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions. They do not see a group of 
judges doing their best to do equal right to plaintiffs and defendants. They 
see a Court with a pro-defendant bias and are left to reach their own 
conclusions about why this is so.  
Restoration of confidence in the federal courts in general, and the 
Supreme Court in particular, is of critical importance to a healthy 
democracy. The Supreme Court must start somewhere in repairing its 
damaged reputation. Professor Hoffheimer calls on the Court to be 
transparent and explain why, in terms of both constitutional principles 
and policy, the constriction of specific and general personal jurisdiction 
is warranted.37 Moreover, Professor Hoffheimer urges the Court to 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 21. 
 33. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 499. 
 34. See e.g., In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-
attacks-courts [https://perma.cc/48WG-N3VW]. 
 35. Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks 
‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-
chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/3KAF-9BSW]. 
 36. Id. 
 37.  Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 552. 
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clearly tie its transformation of personal jurisdiction to the Due Process 
Clause or acknowledge that some other constitutional provision is driving 
the revolution.38 If the Justices heed Professor Hoffheimer’s advice, they 
will take one small step toward restoring confidence in the Court—at 
least, perhaps, law students’ and professors’ confidence. Unfortunately, 
this isn’t likely to happen: “The Supreme Court will not roll out of its 
proverbial bed tomorrow and decide that more than seven decades of 
minimum contacts jurisprudence should be discarded.”39  
Recognizing that the Court is unlikely to jettison its current approach, 
such as it is, to personal jurisdiction, Professor Hoffheimer suggests in 
the alternative that “the Court should slow the revolution” until at least 
five justices can agree on and explain the constitutional justification for 
personal jurisdiction.40 Professor Borchers echoes this suggestion when 
he writes that “[p]erhaps the Supreme Court will tiptoe away and let 
lower courts begin to repair the damage that the high court has wrought 
on jurisdictional law.”41 Maybe silence from the Court on personal 
jurisdiction is the best we can hope for—and one way the Justices can 
begin to restore confidence not only in the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence but in the Court itself. 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Borchers, supra note 15, at 29. 
 40. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 552. 
 41. Borchers, supra note 15, at 30. 
